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Introduction
The extractive sector is of primary 
importance to African states. Of the 
54 countries on the continent, 20 are 
considered by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to be rich in natural resources. 
These are countries whose natural 
resources account for more than 25 per 
cent of total exports. All are sub-Saharan 
African countries: seven export mainly oil 
and gas, and 13 export mainly minerals: 
mostly gold, diamonds and precious stones. 
The significant weight of the extractive 
sector in these states raises the question 
of the taxation of these natural resources, 
which are non-renewable.
An innovative database on the taxation 
of mining industries in Africa1 has 
been put online on the Ferdi website, 
in partnership with Cerdi and ICTD.2 
This database covers 21 sub-Saharan 
African countries3 over a period that varies 
according to the availability of information 
in each country but can go back to the 
1980s. It was created based on the tax 
legislation and regulations of each country, 
essentially the income tax acts, finance acts 
and mining acts.4 It separates the general 
regime (applicable to all companies) from 
the mining regime (applicable only 
to holders of mineral rights for prospecting 
or exploitation on an industrial scale). 
It focuses on a single ore: gold.
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1 The Ferdi database on mining taxation in Africa is available at https://fiscalite-miniere.ferdi.fr/en
2 The authors would like to thank the Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International 
(Ferdi), the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (Cerdi), the International Centre 
for Tax and Development (ICTD) and the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon (ENS Lyon) for their technical and 
financial support.
3 The 21 countries covered by the database are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of the Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
4 The database currently lists more than 1,200 national legal texts.
Summary Brief Number 21
The database covers the 12 main levies 
due by the holders of mineral rights who 
prospect for or exploit gold on an industrial 
scale: fixed fees, surface fees, mining royalties, 
mineral resource rent tax, corporate income tax 
(CIT), minimum tax, capital gains tax (CGT), 
withholding taxes on dividends, interest and 
services, free equity for the State, value added 
tax (VAT) and customs duties on imports. The 
database contains the information necessary 
to understand each of these levies: definition of 
the tax base, tax rates, exemption periods, etc. 
It allows a detailed analysis of African mining 
tax systems and their historical evolution over a 
long period.
The database has been updated by the 
authors of this summary brief, which 
presents tax evolutions between 2016 
and 2018.
i) Mining royalty rates have continued to 
increase since 2010.
ii) Mineral resource rent taxes have been 
introduced in several countries.
iii) Corporate income tax rates and minimum tax 
rates remained stable.
iv) Free equity for the State is becoming more 
and more frequent.
v) Average effective tax rates are increasing.
Mining royalty
The mining royalty is an ad valorem tax that 
taxes the value of the ore when it is sold or 
exported. In principle, the mining royalty is the 
counterpart of the exploitation of the resource. 
Indeed, in most countries, substances present 
in the soil and subsoil, including under territorial 
waters, are by law the property of the State. 
The State therefore only grants exploitation to a 
mining company, granting it a mining right that is 
valid for a limited period of time, over a defined 
area and for a defined mineral. Legally, the 
mining royalty then appears as the counterpart of 
the private appropriation of a public resource. For 
the State, it is an important and relatively secure 
source of revenue, since it affects production, 
regardless of the profitability of the mine.
Mining royalty rates can be fixed, variable or 
progressive. Fixed rates are the most common. 
According to the information available on our 
sample (21 countries), legislation in more than 
three-quarters of the countries (16) had only 
fixed rates in 2018. However, there are more and 
more variable rates which depend on mineral 
prices (Burkina Faso since 2011, Mauritania 
since 2012 and Côte d’Ivoire since 2014). They 
mainly concern gold, with rates between 3 and 
6.5 per cent. Progressive rates based on the 
mine’s profitability also exist. In South Africa, a 
formula is used to calculate a mining royalty rate 
of between 0.5 and 5 per cent for refined ores 
and between 0.5 and 7 per cent for non-refined 
ores. In Niger, the law provides for three rates of 
5.5, 9 and 12 per cent depending on operating 
income. In practice, however, it seems that only 
the minimum rate of 5.5 per cent is applied.
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The mining sector 
accounts for a significant 
share of tax revenues in 
many sub-Saharan African 
countries, and so mining tax 
systems must both attract 
investors and ensure 
sufficient revenues for 
governments.
Between 2016 and 2018, five countries 
changed their mining royalty rates. Rates are 
mostly on the rise. In the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, a major reform of the Mining Act 
was undertaken in 2018. Rates have increased 
from 0.5 to 1 per cent for ferrous metals, from 
2 to 3.5 per cent for non-ferrous metals, from 
2.5 to 3.5 per cent for precious metals and from 
4 to 6 per cent for precious stones. In Sierra 
Leone, the Extractive Industries Revenue Act, 
2018, reintroduced a fourth group of minerals: 
gemstones with a commercial value of more 
than US$500,000 are now taxed at 8 per cent. 
In Tanzania, some royalty rates were modified 
in 2017. For example, concerning gold, the 
rate rose from 4 to 6 per cent. In Senegal, a 
new mining act was adopted in 2016. The ad 
valorem royalty has abandoned its single rate 
of 3 per cent in favour of a multitude of rates 
differentiated according to minerals and their 
degree of refining. For gold, the rates are 
now 3.5 per cent for refined ore in Senegal 
compared to 5 per cent for crude or refined ore 
abroad. In Cameroon, ad valorem tax rates fell 
in 2017, but this decrease follows a significant 
increase two years earlier. Despite the decline 
in 2017, the rates are still relatively high 
compared to rates currently applied in the other 
countries in the sample (which themselves have 
been rising for several years): 8 per cent for 
precious stones, 5 per cent for precious metals, 
10 per cent for radioactive substances and their 
derivatives and 5 per cent for base metals and 
other mineral substances.
Mineral resource rent tax
The purpose of the mineral resource rent 
tax, as its name suggests, is to directly tax 
the rent, i.e. the net cash flow. In theory, 
this tax would be ideal because it would be 
economically neutral, i.e. it would not change 
either the decision to go into production or the 
production choice. Thanks to such a tax, it would 
even become possible to tax up to 100 per 
cent of the rent. In practice, however, there are 
many uncertainties about the future operating 
conditions of a mine. It is therefore difficult to 
estimate ex ante the value of the rent accurately. 
A tax on pure rent is therefore almost impossible 
to implement.
Some countries are trying or have tried 
to introduce levies similar to a mineral 
resource rent tax. According to the information 
available on our sample (21 countries), in 
2016, fewer than one fifth of the states (four 
countries) had or had used such a levy in their 
legislation: Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and 
Zimbabwe. Also called additional profit tax, 
these levies specific to the mining sector are 
mainly aimed at capturing a larger share of the 
rent. These levies vary greatly from one country 
to another, and often pose significant practical 
difficulties.
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Following the increase in 
commodity prices in the 
2000s, most African 
countries reformed their 
mining acts to increase the 
tax burden on mining 
companies. This trend is 
continuing, with mining 
royalty rates rising, mineral 
resource rent taxes 
reappearing and free equity 
for the State increasing.
Until 2017, mineral resource rent taxes 
were gradually disappearing. Ghana 
repealed its additional profit tax in 2001, 
when it introduced its new Internal Revenue 
Act. Guinea waived its additional profit tax 
in 2011, with the entry into force of its new 
Mining Act. Cote d’Ivoire did the same with 
its additional profit tax in 2014, when it 
adopted its new Mining Act. According to 
the information available on our sample 
(21 countries), Zimbabwe was therefore the 
last country in 2017 to retain an additional 
profits tax in its Income Tax Act. However, 
2018 saw a resurgence of rent taxes.
In 2018, three new countries introduced 
levies into their legislation that could be 
similar to a mineral resource rent tax. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has 
created a special tax on excess profits. The 
tax, the rate of which is 50 per cent, is only 
due when the prices are 25 per cent higher 
than those provided for in the feasibility 
study. Sierra Leone has introduced a 
mineral resource rent tax that is similar to 
the additional profits tax in Zimbabwe. The 
tax rate is determined by the formula: 
(40 – income tax rate) / (100 – income tax 
rate), where ‘income tax rate’ refers to the 
corporate income tax rate on mining 
companies. Chad has also introduced a rent 
tax. Very simple in its calculation, it is, 
however, far from the principle of a rent tax 
as it applies to mining companies whose 
turnover significantly exceeds the deductible 
corporate tax expenses. The tax rate is set 
at 50 per cent and the base defined as the 
‘difference between turnover, on the one 
hand, and operating expenses, including 
royalties, increased by 50 per cent, on the 
other hand’.
Corporate income tax 
and minimum tax
Corporate income tax is an income tax that 
taxes the profits of companies. Its base 
corresponds to the difference between 
revenues and deductible expenses. Deductible 
expenses include actual expenses (operating 
costs, financial expenses, deductible taxes) 
and fictitious expenses (depreciation, loss 
carryforwards). Corporate income tax rates 
have declined in recent decades. According to 
the information available on our sample 
(21 countries), all states currently apply 
corporate income tax rates between 25 and 
35 per cent for their general regime, with the 
exception of Madagascar whose rate is 
20 per cent. In contrast, for the mining regime, 
the laws of three countries may result in rates 
that fall outside this range. South Africa 
proposes a formula to calculate a progressive 
rate between 0 and 34 per cent. Madagascar 
has three rates of 25, 35 and 40 per cent that 
increase with the internal rate of return (IRR) 
of industrial gold mines only. Finally, Zimbabwe 
is reducing its rate to only 15 per cent for 
holders of mining leases.
Corporate income tax may be accompanied 
by a minimum tax. The minimum tax is based 
on a company’s turnover. It concerns mainly 
French-speaking African countries, although 
similar provisions may exist in English-speaking 
African countries. Its objective is to secure the 
State’s revenue. It is due annually, at the 
same time as corporate income tax. However, 
it is often paid in quarterly instalments. If the 
corporate income tax is lower than the minimum 
tax, the company only pays the minimum 
tax. Otherwise, it pays the balance, i.e. the 
difference between the corporate income 
tax and the minimum tax. According to 
the information available on our sample 
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(21 countries), concerning large companies, 
states are applying minimum tax rates between 
0.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent in 2018.
Guinea is the only country to have recently 
changed its rates. The Finance Act, 2018, 
reduced the corporate income tax rate from 
35 to 25 per cent for the general regime. 
However, telephone companies, banks and 
insurance companies, as well as companies 
importing, storing and distributing petroleum 
products remain taxed at 35 per cent of their 
profits. Holders of mineral rights were already 
subject to a rate of 30 per cent, which remains 
unchanged. The Finance Act, 2018, also halved 
the minimum tax rate from 3 to 1.5 per cent. 
However, this last measure will be cancelled 
by the Finance Act, 2019.
Free equity for the State
States may require equity investment in 
mining companies. Generally, mining acts 
provide that the holder of the mining right must 
create a company under national law in which 
the State participates, free of charge, usually 
to 10 per cent. This free shareholding may 
not be diluted, even in the event of a capital 
increase. Additional participation of the State is 
possible, but this is then acquired under normal 
conditions, i.e. in cash. Where this additional 
participation is provided for, however, it may not 
exceed a percentage of the capital set by law.
Becoming a shareholder not only allows the 
State to have access to information but also 
to receive dividends. It is a way to increase the 
part of the rent it receives on a mining project. 
However, unlike the payment of taxes, which 
is mandatory, the payment of dividends is a 
discretionary decision taken by the company’s 
general meeting. In order to secure its income, 
some countries therefore provide for the 
payment of priority dividends.
More and more states are demanding to 
enter into the capital of mining companies. 
According to the information available on our 
sample (21 countries), less than half of the 
states (10 countries5) planned free participation 
in 2008, specifying a rate in the law. Chad also 
mentioned the possibility of participation, but 
no rate was set. The Chadian Mining Act only 
stipulated that, in the event of participation, 
the nature and modalities of this participation 
should be determined in the mining agreement. 
By 2018, more than three-quarters of the states 
in the sample (16 countries6) required such 
non-contributory participation.
In addition, the required rates of non- 
contributory participation are increasing. 
The free equity for the State in the company’s 
capital is generally 10 per cent. Until 2016, only 
two countries were exceptions: the Democratic 
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Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal.
6 In 2018, the 16 countries requiring free equity for the State are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of the Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Tanzania.
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Generally, mining acts 
provide that the holder of 
the mining right must create 
a company under national 
law in which the State 
participates, free of charge, 
usually to 10 per cent.
Republic of the Congo asked for only 5 per 
cent, while Guinea set differentiated rates of up 
to 15 per cent for different minerals. In recent 
years, several countries that have inserted or 
modified their participation have set rates above 
10 per cent. In Tanzania, the amendment of the 
Mining Act in 2017 introduced a 16 per cent free 
equity. In Chad, the new Mining Act that came 
into force in 2018 requires a non-contributory 
participation of 12.5 per cent. Finally, in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the major 
reform of the Mining Act in 2018 created a 
progressive participation: the mining company 
must first transfer 10 per cent of its shares to 
the State when it grants its mining right, to 
which is then added an additional 5 per cent 
each time the right is renewed. In addition, at 
least 10 per cent of the capital must be held by 
persons of Congolese nationality.
Conclusion
Recent legislative evolutions are leading to 
an increase in the taxes payable by industrial 
mining companies. Indeed, most of the tax 
measures adopted between 2016 and 2018 are 
in this direction. Mining royalty rates have been 
increased in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania. 
Levies similar to a mineral resource rent tax 
have been introduced in Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. Free 
equity for the State is more numerous and its 
rates are rising in Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Tanzania. The only significant 
decrease is from the previously extremely 
high ad valorem royalty rates that Cameroon 
introduced in 2015.
However, it is difficult to compare tax 
systems solely on the basis of their tax 
rates. The total tax burden of a company is 
measured by the sum of several taxes, some 
of which are interdependent. For example, 
mining royalties, surface royalties and fixed 
fees are generally deducted from the corporate 
income tax base. The payment of dividends 
to shareholders, including the State, depends 
on the remaining after-tax profit. Finally, the 
amount of taxes payable only makes sense in 
relation to the amount of investments made 
and profits made. In order to consider all these 
factors, it is relevant to calculate an average 
effective tax rate.
The average effective tax rate (AETR) of a 
mining project is the government’s share 
of the mineral resource rent. It is calculated 
as the discounted sum of government levies 
divided by the discounted sum of net cash 
flows before taxes. The level of the AETR 
depends, of course, on the tax system, but 
also on the economic conditions of the mine, 
such as production costs and ore prices. 
Indeed, under identical economic conditions, 
a viable mine in one country may not be viable 
in another country with a heavier tax system. 
Similarly, an economically viable mine for a 
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The advantage of the 
AETR is that it allows a tax 
burden to be synthesised, 
well beyond nominal tax 
rates alone. It therefore 
makes it possible to 
compare tax systems, even 
very different ones, both 
spatially (between countries) 
and temporally (within the 
same country).
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given ore price may become loss-making if 
prices fall. The advantage of the AETR is that 
it allows a tax burden to be synthesised, well 
beyond nominal tax rates alone. It therefore 
makes it possible to compare tax systems, 
even very different ones, both spatially 
(between countries) and temporally (within the 
same country).
The cash flow model used to obtain these 
results is the mineral resource rent sharing 
model developed by Ferdi.7 It models a mine 
representative of African open-pit gold mines 
with an average grade (3g/t). This mine 
roduces 1.6 million ounces of gold over a 
13-year mine lifetime. The tax system applied 
to this mine is the one in force under each 
country’s legislation in 2018 and for a fixed gold 
price of US$1,400/oz. It is composed of eight 
levies: fixed fees, surface fees, mining royalty, 
corporate income tax, minimum taxes, 
withholding tax on interest, withholding tax on 
dividends and free equity for the State. Due to 
the difficulties they create, mineral resource rent 
taxes are not taken into account, which is a 
limitation to the comparison of the AETRs.
The calculation of AETRs confirms the 
increase in the tax burden on mining 
companies between 2016 and 2018. 
According to the information available on our 
sample (21 countries), the AETRs in 2018 are 
between 27.0 and 52.2 per cent. Between 2016 
and 2018, the average of the AETRs increased 
from 42.7 to 43.8 per cent and the median from 
41.5 to 46.2 per cent. More than half of the 
states (11 countries8) experienced an increase 
in their AETR, while decreases were rare 
(three countries9). By removing small variations 
(between plus or minus 1 point of AETR), the 
AETRs of five states were truly marked by 
a significant increase. And only Cameroon’s 
AETR experienced a significant decline. Since 
2015, the country has had by far the highest 
AETR (63.0 per cent, compared to 51.1 per 
cent for Guinea). By reducing the excessive 
rate of its ad valorem royalty, which fell from 
15 per cent to 5 per cent for gold in 2016, 
Cameroon is no longer the country that taxes 
mining companies the most in 2018.
The largest increases in AETRs are in 
Tanzania, Chad, Kenya, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Senegal. These 
five countries all reformed their mining acts 
between 2016 and 2018. Senegal’s AETR 
was already among the highest in 2016 (47.8 
per cent in 2016 and 50.4 per cent in 2018), 
while the AETRs of the other four countries 
were below the sample average in 2016. For 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Kenya, the increase in the AETR can be seen 
as a simple catch-up. These countries are in 
the average of the AETRs in 2018. In contrast, 
Chad and Tanzania are now the two countries 
that tax mining companies the most (with 
AETRs of 52.2 and 51.7 per cent respectively). 
In the case of Chad, by applying the mineral 
resource rent tax as provided for in the new 
Mining Act, the AETR would even rise to 76 
per cent.
7 The results of the simulations carried out using Ferdi’s mineral resource rent sharing model are available at https://fiscalite-
miniere.ferdi.fr/simulations. 
8 Between 2016 and 2018, the 11 countries whose simulations led to an increase in their AETR are Tanzania (+11.3 percentage 
points), Chad (+9.6 points), Kenya (+6.3 points), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (+4.8 points), Senegal (+2.6 points), 
South Africa (+0.8 point), Niger (+0.2 points), Guinea (+0.1 point), Cote d’Ivoire (+0.07 point), Gabon (+0.02 point) and 
Madagascar (+0.01 point). 
9 Between 2016 and 2018, the three countries whose simulations led to a decrease in their AETR are Cameroon (-12.1 percentage 
points), Burkina Faso (-0.02 point) and Sierra Leone (-0.01 point).
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